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The comprehensive solution currently underway for the 
so-called ‘1972 Burundian refugees’ in Tanzania can offer 
important lessons for other protracted refugee situations.  
Durable solutions for Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania 
Jessie Thomson
The first major wave of mass 
displacement in Burundi’s recent 
history followed the 1972 ‘selective 
genocide’ against the Hutu 
population. The conflict produced 
one of Africa’s most prolonged 
refugee situations, in which over 
200,000 Burundian refugees have 
lived in three designated settlements 
in western Tanzania, known as the 
Old Settlements, for 36 years. This 
refugee population is distinct from 
those groups of refugees who arrived 
later and were hosted in refugee 
camps in north-west Tanzania. 
Refugees from 1972 were allocated 
five hectares per family and by 1985 
were largely self-sufficient. In 2007, 
the governments of Tanzania and 
Burundi announced their desire to 
find a lasting solution to this refugee 
situation. Refugees in Tanzania’s 
Old Settlements were given a choice 
about their future. Some elected to 
return to Burundi, while the vast 
majority expressed a desire to remain 
in Tanzania. A handful of others, who 
fled first to neighbouring countries 
and then to Tanzania, were accepted 
for resettlement in third countries. 
So-called ‘comprehensive solutions’ 
– which make use of all three 
durable solutions (return, local 
integration and resettlement) – are 
rare. Understanding how this 
comprehensive solution came 
about, the range of actors involved 
and the barriers to sustainability 
could help in future efforts to 
resolve similar protracted refugee 
situations around the world.
The emergence of a 
comprehensive	solution
Following the consolidation of peace 
in Burundi and with the aim of 
developing a comprehensive solutions 
strategy, UNHCR initiated the 
establishment of an Old Settlements 
Task Force (OSTF) in partnership 
with the governments of Tanzania 
and Burundi. This was followed by 
a census and full registration of the 
population in the Old Settlements 
and resulted in the recommendation 
in December 2007 that those who 
wished to return be supported to do 
so and that those who expressed a 
desire to stay (approximately 172,000 
people) go through an expedited 
naturalisation process and be 
supported in their full integration 
into new communities in Tanzania. 
Asked why, after 36 years, the 
Government of Tanzania decided to 
naturalise such an unprecedented 
number of refugees, the Minister of 
Home Affairs stated: “We felt that 
it was our duty as a country to take 
cognizance of the fact that these 
people have no home other than 
Tanzania.”1 The initiative emerged, 
he said, out of the government’s 
commitment to peace and security 
in the region and in recognition 
of the possible repercussions of 
asking 200,000 people to return to 
Burundi after so many years. 
The Government of Tanzania, with 
the support of UNHCR, has largely 
completed the initial phase of the 
expedited naturalisation process. 
Citizenship will not be granted, 
however, to anyone until they have 
left the Old Settlements, as “those 
who have elected to stay must fully 
integrate into Tanzania society in 
the interest of long-term stability.”2 
With regard to voluntary return, 
UNHCR has committed itself to 
ensuring that all 46,000 people who 
have indicated their desire to return 
are transported in safety and with 
dignity by the end of September 2009. 
Those identified for resettlement 
have largely left the refugee camps 
in north-western Tanzania for third 
countries. While the comprehensive 
strategy as it was initially proposed 
did not include reference to 
resettlement, over 8,000 refugees from 
1972 were identified for resettlement 
– people who are not self-sufficient 
in Tanzania and would be likely 
to face a multitude of challenges 
if they returned to Burundi.3
While this is a good example of a truly 
comprehensive solution involving 
all three durable solutions and 
engaging a wide range of actors from 
a diversity of sectors, ongoing inter-
agency collaboration and sustained 
support from the donor community 
will be essential to ensuring that 
each solution is truly durable. 
Local integration
While the 1972 Burundian refugees 
have been largely self-reliant for 
decades and have been de facto locally 
integrated in the Old Settlements, 
the government has said that those 
who are naturalised will be expected 
to relocate within Tanzania in order 
to prevent both the encroachment of 
the Old Settlements on conservation 
areas and the creation of an isolated 
or differentiated group within 
Tanzania. It remains unclear, however, 
how they will ensure that they all 
actually relocate from where their 
livelihoods, families and communities 
have been based for over 30 years. 
Plans are still being developed to 
set out where the newly naturalised 
citizens will be relocated, under what 
timelines and – given the fact that 
farmers make up the vast majority 
of this population – whether or not 
they will have access to land. 
Successful integration into 
communities in Tanzania will 
require support for social services, 
particularly health and education, 
in receiving communities. It will 
also require not only that UNHCR 
receive sufficient resources but 
also that development partners be 
willing to work to support these 
communities. The UN’s ‘Delivering 
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been cited by both the government 
and UNHCR as an essential way 
to pursue joint programming. 
Voluntary repatriation
Despite the fact that only 20% of the 
1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
elected to go home, their arrival 
after such an extended period of 
time is having a profound impact. 
In July 2008, each person received a 
cash grant4 to support their return 
and reintegration but, as they were 
largely self-reliant in Tanzania, it 
was agreed that food assistance 
would not be provided. At the 
same time, this population has a 
slightly larger baggage allowance 
for return, which has enabled 
them to bring food and non-food 
items from the Old Settlements.
The sustainability of their return 
is one of the most pressing issues 
facing the operation. Many have 
returned to find their land occupied 
after their long absence and the 
secondary occupants have accrued 
certain legal rights. Or they have 
elected to return to Burundi but 
do not know where their family 
originally came from after several 
generations abroad. Restitution of 
land and property is complicated 
by the fact that many lack sufficient 
documentation to demonstrate 
their legal title to the land. 
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi recognised 
the political dimension of land 
issues and called for respect of 
principles that encourage the return 
of refugees and the recovery of 
land or compensation.5 While the 
Peacebuilding Commission has 
acknowledged the importance of 
resolving land disputes for sustainable 
peace, the National Commission 
on Land and other Possessions, 
established to resolve land disputes, 
has had insufficient capacity to 
respond to the extensive and complex 
land and property issues facing 
Burundi in this post-conflict period.  
For landless returnees, the 
Government of Burundi, in 
partnership with the international 
community, has begun to implement 
its ‘villagisation’ policy, which aims 
to establish Peace Villages. The 
government  has acknowledged, 
however, that it had been so 
preoccupied with finding a physical 
place for people to resettle that it did 
not fully assess access to basic services 
in and around these new village 
sites. Further partnership with the 
international community and effective 
planning to ensure both access to land 
and basic services will be essential. 
Resettlement
Resettlement has played an important 
role in efforts to resolve the protracted 
refugee situation in Tanzania.  
First, it has been and continues 
to be used as a protection tool for 
individuals with legal and physical 
protection problems. Second, it has 
been used in a strategic manner 
to complement voluntary return 
and local integration in the context 
of the 1972 caseload. To this end, 
group processing was pursued for 
the resettlement of these individuals 
from the 1972 caseload currently 
residing in Tanzania’s refugee camps.  
Four important criteria define this 
group: they fled Burundi in 1972; 
they have been displaced more than 
Before UNHCR started its facilitated return programme in 
spring 2002 Burundi ranked second (after Afghanistan) 
in UNHCR’s global ‘country of origin’ statistics, despite its 
small size. With the return of half a million refugees and the 
majority of the country’s 375,000 internally displaced persons  
since then, the war-ravaged country of some eight million 
people has had to reintegrate about 10% of its population. 
Refugee return has taken place mostly to rural areas in 
border provinces, in a context of widespread poverty, lack 
of basic infrastructure and scarcity of land. To gain better 
information on the situation of returned refugees, UNHCR set 
up a country-wide returnee monitoring scheme. This, and a 
number of assessments organised with partners, generated 
the following conclusions.
Firstly, the great majority of returnees do not face protection 
problems specific to their status as returnees, and 
discrimination against them hardly occurs. They usually return 
to their hills (collines), where they are supported by their 
family, clan or other community members. With regards to 
socio-economic reintegration, the situation of returnees who 
have access to agricultural land and who returned several 
years ago is the same as that of the resident population. 
Secondly, some observers have questioned the sustainability 
of return due to the dire socio-economic prospects in key 
return communes. In the main communes of return, the 
population has increased by an estimated 50% since 2002. In 
the longer term, support in these regions needs to target the  
communities at large and not returnees in particular.
Thirdly, land tenure conflicts involving returnees are on the 
rise, particularly since UNHCR began to facilitate in 2008 the 
return of former refugees from 1972 from Tanzania’s ‘Old 
Settlements’. By early July 2009 some 41,000 refugees from 
the 1972 caseload had returned. Even though this is less 
than 10% of the total number of returnees, their arrival has 
attracted significant attention from humanitarian actors. The 
Government of Burundi, UNHCR and other agencies have 
responded to the rise in land disputes by increasing support 
for land conflict mediation, resulting in solutions such as land 
sharing. While these combined efforts have already resolved 
thousands of cases, the 
land issue remains a risk 
factor in terms of successful 
reintegration and peaceful 
cohabitation particularly 
in southern Burundi. Its 
resolution is all the more 
pressing in the run-up to the 
national elections in 2010.
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Studying the impact that a refugee population has on its 
host country’s economy is important when assessing and 
developing government refugee strategies, particularly in 
protracted refugee situations. 
Refugees: asset or burden? 
Patricia A Ongpin
Between 1993 and 2000, Tanzania was 
host to almost 1.5 million refugees. 
Since the late 1990s, greater efforts 
have been made to repatriate refugees 
but even today there remain some 
320,000 refugees and asylum seekers 
in Tanzania. Even with the presence 
of international agencies supporting 
the assistance efforts, such a high 
volume of refugees has inevitably 
had an impact on Tanzania’s domestic 
economic situation. The government 
has publicly announced its displeasure 
with the stretching of resources 
caused by the refugee presence as 
well as with the threats that they are 
thought to pose to domestic stability.1 
However, some counter these claims 
by outlining benefits that otherwise 
would not have occurred were it 
not for the presence of refugees. It 
is important to understand both 
claims and to use such knowledge 
to ensure that refugee policies 
support national economic growth. 
Economic effects
The Tanzanian government attests 
that the refugee population it hosts 
has become a burden to the nation’s 
development by exacerbating, if not 
creating, a scarcity of resources. They 
assert that the quality of national 
programmes such as welfare and the 
national poverty reduction strategy 
has been compromised by the 
reallocation of funds from government 
resources to refugee programmes. 
It is also argued that the sharing of 
common goods and infrastructure has 
strained not only resources but also 
relations between refugees and citizens 
who find themselves competing for 
those goods. This is most often seen 
in the use of grazing land, water 
sources and transport routes. 
Contrary to the government’s position, 
some researchers have claimed that 
the activity ensuing from the refugee 
population has stimulated the national 
economy. International organisations 
are said to have increased national 
financial capacity by providing 
funds to refugee projects as well as 
injecting much needed revenue via 
the tax and customs payments made 
for the aid and supplies brought into 
the country. Additionally, they have 
also invested in significant amounts 
of infrastructure development to 
enable efficient operations on the 
ground, thus further strengthening 
the sevices and infrastructure that are 
available to locals as well as refugees.2
Debate on this topic is further 
stimulated by the effect that refugees 
have shown on the labour sector and 
the pricing market. Refugees have 
provided a supply of cheap labour 
which can crowd out their Tanzanian 
counterparts from the employment 
market.3 Yet this has had a positive 
effect on opportunities for capacity 
building in communities, with a 
larger supply of workers for labour-
intensive industries such as mining 
and agriculture.4 Such a dichotomous 
effect is also evident in the prices 
of goods and services. The arrival 
of the refugees and the ensuing 
international relief agency workers 
caused an increase in the prices of 
staple foods and real estate, thus 
reducing the purchasing power of 
both refugees and locals. However, 
even with the rise in prices, the 
quality of social welfare also rose, 
thus allowing a relative improvement 
in the standard of living.5
A balance sheet 
Despite the limited quantifiable 
evidence available and the difficulty 
in determining exact costs and 
benefits of the refugees’ presence, 
it is possible to understand their 
relative impact through the use of a 
balance sheet. By summarising the 
evidence for benefits and costs, then 
weighing the arguments against 
each other, a positive or negative 
score on the economic impact can be 
hypothesised. Using this approach, a 
balance sheet emerges suggesting that 
the refugee population in Tanzania 
creates a negative economic effect on 
domestic security as well as access to 
food and shelter, a positive effect on 
government finances and business, 
once; most have spent almost all 
their lives in exile, and many were 
born in exile; they do not have the 
option of local integration and are 
either unable or unwilling to return 
home.  However, it has created a 
pull factor for individuals from 
the 1993 Burundian caseload in 
Tanzania’s refugee camps who could 
not understand why they were not 
eligible for resettlement as well. While 
the difference in profile and needs 
may seem obvious from the outside, 
the two groups are integrated in the 
same refugee camps in north-western 
Tanzania and many face the same 
challenges in this protracted situation.  
Conclusion
The efforts currently underway 
to resolve the protracted refugee 
situation in this region are 
impressive and demonstrate a 
number of innovative components.  
Involvement of the refugees 
themselves through census and 
registration has ensured that return 
is truly voluntary. It is an inspiring 
example of a careful balance between 
responsibility sharing and state 
responsibility in support of voluntary 
repatriation, local integration 
and resettlement. Moreover, tools 
such as the Peacebuilding Fund 
and the UN’s ‘Delivering as One’ 
initiative have provided new 
opportunities for inter-agency 
and inter-sectoral collaboration. 
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